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ARTICLE
The risk of re-identification versus the need to identify
individuals in rare disease research
Mats G Hansson*,1, Hanns Lochmüller2, Olaf Riess3, Franz Schaefer4, Michael Orth5, Yaffa Rubinstein6,
Caron Molster7, Hugh Dawkins7,8,9,10, Domenica Taruscio11, Manuel Posada12 and Simon Woods13
There is a growing concern in the ethics literature and among policy makers that de-identification or coding of personal data and
biospecimens is not sufficient for protecting research subjects from privacy invasions and possible breaches of confidentiality
due to the possibility of unauthorized re-identification. At the same time, there is a need in medical science to be able to
identify individual patients. In particular for rare disease research there is a special and well-documented need for research
collaboration so that data and biosamples from multiple independent studies can be shared across borders. In this article, we
identify the needs and arguments related to de-identification and re-identification of patients and research subjects and suggest
how the different needs may be balanced within a framework of using unique encrypted identifiers.
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INTRODUCTION
In an era of genomics, rapid technological advances, and globalization
there are new challenges for protecting the identity and the privacy
of the patient and balancing privacy interests against the needs of
particular patient groups or societal interests; specifically for patients
with rare diseases. These developments have resulted in a rapid increase
in the volume of data collection and secure data-sharing platforms. In
contrast, individuals increasingly are making their personal information
available in social networking and globally, especially in the case of rare
diseases, to access improved diagnosis, inform themselves of manage-
ment and therapy options and to access clinical trials. From the health
services perspective, additional safeguards are required to protect
confidentiality and patient privacy but without restricting access to
improved services, as these new advances facilitate the free flow and
sharing of data between different organizations and across international
boundaries. In particular, there is a growing concern in the ethics
literature and among policy makers that de-identification or coding of
personal data and biospecimens is not sufficient for protecting research
subjects from privacy invasions and possible breaches of confidentiality
due to the possibility of re-identification.1–3
As pointed out by Tabor et al, some bioethics research and consent
discussions tend to focus on identifiability as a harm in itself, rather
than on the potential subsequent harms.4,5 This emphasis may lead to
an imbalance between different interests in the ethical assessment
where different kinds of potential harms as well as benefits need to
be balanced against each other. As argued previously, research subjects
have interests at the beginning of the research, for example, on being
informed about the purpose, expected benefits and risks of harm, as
well as during the process of research, for example, preservation of
confidentiality.6 They also have interests related to the end of the
research line, reaping the fruit of research in terms of new, improved
and safer medical treatment. Consequently, they have an interest in
committing to the widest possible access and most effective use of data
and biosamples among researchers as being conducive to those ends.
Accordingly, ethical assessments related to data and biobank manage-
ment in research need to move beyond the narrow focus of
identifiability and acknowledge and balance the potential harms and
benefits in a broader context. An important primary task then is to
explore why it is important to identify individual research subjects, that
is, that a given data set refers to one specific individual, entailing the
possibility to distinguish between data belonging to different individuals.
AIM
The aim of this paper is to discuss the need to protect the
confidentiality of research participants and the need to make them
identifiable to facilitate medical treatment and/or for biomedical
research.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING PRIVACY
The two key elements of privacy are (i) that an individual has access
to a secluded private sphere and (ii) that each individual is free to
decide who will have access to this sphere, for example, to private
information or to a private space.7 Invasion of privacy can lead to
injustice through unfairly discriminatory use of personal information
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though an individual may be harmed merely by having exposed to the
public gaze what they would prefer to be private.
Respect for privacy is a means of respecting an individual but it
can also be instrumental to establish trust, for example, in medical
research contexts. In the context of data sharing, as we discuss in
this paper, privacy is to be respected by information and consent
procedures and protected by confidentiality procedures. In this paper,
we argue that the use of a unique identifier to enable wide data sharing
is a proportionate and responsible means of balancing privacy interests
with important goods that data sharing is likely to achieve.
THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS
In order to be able to accurately diagnose; classify the genetic of rare
diseases, and to address the complexity of managing many of these
diseases there is a need for good knowledge and a reliable high quality
of data. A critical component in building the knowledge and evidence
is the need for large volume of clinical data collected and biosamples
from affected individuals and their families. These collections enable
genotype–phenotype studies to understand how particular genetic
changes, that is, the genotype, produce the different disease character-
istics we see clinically, that is, the phenotype and how other genes
moderate or otherwise the pathology of a disease. This is particularly
important in rare diseases where the phenotype results often from
a single genetic change. The rarity of the condition is particularly
powerful from a clinical perspective because it provides a very high
degree of clarity of the genotype–phenotype relationship, and the
biological pathways involved; but equally the rarity also represents a
barrier to diagnosis and discovery as there are limited data due to the
relatively small numbers of affected individuals. Consequently, there is
a special and well-documented need for research collaboration so that
data and biosamples from multiple independent studies can be shared
across borders.8–10 The two data sets of clinical data and biospecimen
data are critical for understanding the pathogenesis and the manage-
ment of diseases, both common and rare. In relation to empowering
clinical diagnosis of diseases and clinical discovery of disease mechan-
isms, and possible therapies, there are several scenarios where the
absence of a re-identification method such as a unique identifier, of
data or samples potentially put patients at risk. There is a risk of not
reaching scientific objectives in research projects, because data cannot
be connected on an individual patient level. Not reaching clinical
studies objectives because of insufficient scientific evidence may also
put patients at risk by prolonging the period for diagnosis and the
options for treatment. Data sets of different experiments and samples
of the same patients are held by different research organizations
such as samples held at a biobank of university X, clinical or genetic
data from a natural history study or registry with hospital Y and
biomarker data with research lab Z. Having different organizations
involved, including cross border, is a common situation in clinical
research for rare diseases. To fully exploit unanticipated, out-of-the
normal signals in the biomarker results, the researcher (z) would need
to have access to clinical and genetic data (y) of a particular participant
from the hospital Y and be in a position to request another sample (x)
of the same participant from the biorepository X. In the absence of
a re-identification method such as a unique identifier, this research
question may remain unanswered. Alternatively, the research needs to
be re-done that may not be feasible based on costs and participant/
sample availability without access to shared data and resources across
borders. In addition, feeding back individual-level results to partici-
pants or inclusion in follow-up research may be impossible without
a secure way of re-identification.
IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS WHILE PROTECTING
CONFIDENTIALITY
The basic rationale of a unique identifying system is that a medical
researcher puts identifying information about a research participant
into a client application that in turn sends encrypted information to
a server application, which then returns a generated unique identifier for
that individual. A unique identifier for research purposes is a random
sequence of characters that is unique to each research participant,
regardless of the study, without exposing personally identifiable informa-
tion. It should also be observed that with such a system ‘personal data’ in
the legal sense is still being processed; and thus, the usual safeguards such
as consent and ethics approval must be observed. Identifiers, known as
Global Unique Identifiers or GUIDs, for example, NDAR GUID,11
GRDR GUID (https://grdr.ncats.nih.gov/index.php?option= com_con-
tent&view= article&id= 113&Itemid=129) and HDI,12 are meant
primarily to facilitate the following patient data in a larger setting.
A research network involved in autism research has recently demon-
strated how such a system (GUID) may be set up in order to achieve a
favourable balance between the competing goals of distinguishing
individuals, collecting accurate information for matching and protecting
confidentiality.11 The GRDR GUID facilitates also linking biospecimens
and the patient clinical information in GRDR by linking the GUID to the
specimen of the same participants (http://ncats.nih.gov/grdr).
A similar system is operated by the European Huntington’s Disease
Network (EHDN) to generate unique IDs for participants in their
studies including the international observational study REGISTRY.13
Across participating sites, the algorithm for generating that ID is the
same. This means that the same ID is generated irrespective of where a
given individual takes part in the study. Thus, a participant cannot
take part in a study more than once. In addition, the HDID identifier
allows the site that enrols the participant to identify that participant at
the annual follow-up visit. Further, the same algorithm has been used
in other HD studies, for instance TRACK-HD.12 This HDID identifier
means it is possible to merge the data of REGISTRY and TRACK-HD.
The same is true for the recently launched global HD observational
study Enroll-HD (www.enroll-hd.org). Participants who already
took part in REGISTRY keep their unique identifier in Enroll-HD.
Once they have consented for Enroll-HD, all data in REGISTRY can
be merged with the Enroll-HD database.
Importantly, these systems will generate a unique ID for each
participant, if the identifiable information (or the hash code) is
correctly transmitted. The system does not retain any personal,
identifiable data of the participant, but will recognize whether an ID
is requested for the same individual based on the same identifiable
data that are required (from the submitter) to generate the ID. We will
not go deeper into technical details in this paper, but when setting up
systems like this, one has to be sensitive to the possibility that the
process of determining which personal identifiers are used to create
the unique identification may touch on social, cultural and ethical
sensitivities for the research participants. So even though breaches of
confidentiality may be avoided there may be other ethical sensitivities
to be managed. In the referred autism linkage study, the coordinators
experienced significant resistance from subjects in collecting some
kinds of personal identifying information, for example, a mother’s
maiden name and government issued identifier (usually social security
number). Upstream consultation with patient organizations can be
very useful in facilitating open and informative dialogue, help to
identify potential sensitivities and to enable a meaningful informed
consent process.
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THE RISK OF RE-IDENTIFICATION
There have been several efforts to demonstrate that re-identification of
individuals following the sharing of anonymised data is possible by
using publicly available databases.14,15 Gymrek relied on publicly
accessible Internet resources in order to show that a combination
of a surname with other types of data, such as age and state, can be
used to triangulate data and thus reveal the identity of the target.15
Arguments like these have been used in order to substantiate calls
for regulatory changes and policy recommendations.3,16,17 However, as
was shown in a recent systematic review of re-identification
attacks (see below) on health data, there are reasons to proceed with
caution and to wait for more nuanced accounts before changing
policies and regulatory frameworks. It should be remembered, as
argued above, that too strict legal regulatory requirements to maintain
anonymity may be detrimental to research where maximum benefit
from data may only be achieved by distinguishing individuals within
the data set.
Searching through 1522 reports of demonstrated re-identifications,
El Emam et al18 concluded that the overall success rate for all re-
identification attacks was approximately 26 and 34% for health data.
However, the confidence interval around these estimates was large,
partly because many of the attacks were on small databases.
In addition, not all of these examples were using current standards
for de-identification, such as the USA Safe Harbor standard or
the statistical standard specified in the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
We should not be so alarmed whether databases are easily hacked
due to negligence regarding the de-identification or coding measures
used; as this is to be expected. Of more concern are the serious
breaches of existing standards that these databases did not employ the
adequate measures to protect participants in the first place; this is the
matter for serious concern. El Emam et al. found only two studies
that succeeded in re-identification when the original data were
de-identified in accordance with HIPAA standards. One of these
attacks was on health data with the success rate in terms of percentage
of records re-identified being 0.013%, which may be considered low.
Some of the issues in the policy discussions on re-identification
emanate from the deliberate efforts that have been made to identify
individuals accessing data associated with queries made through
internet services, which are not comparable to the systems described
here. When the New York Times reported on the ability to identify
a woman it was only possible because her queries included her town
name and her personal name (ibid. p.6). It should also be observed
that a majority of the demonstration attacks were made by highly
qualified experts in the fields of computer science, and they were made
for demonstration purposes, not in order to use the information.
El Emam et al conclude that it would be prudent for data custodians
to use existing standards for de-identification while applying due diligence
in prohibiting re-identification attempts as part of data-sharing agree-
ments, providing accountability for data custodian’s actions. However, as
they assert, this may be appropriate for health data records and databases;
regarding genomic information there is need for further analyses where
the potential of combining genomic, omic and environmental informa-
tion for identification of individuals has not yet been sufficiently
explored.19
RISK OF HARM
A number of potential harms have been associated with the collection
and exchange of sensitive personal data. It has been suggested that any
re-identification may potentially harm study participants because
it will release information on individual disease risks into the public
domain.20 Data subjects might then become vulnerable to the
consequences of detrimental genetic information being accessible by
insurance companies or employers. Lunshof et al4 suggest that
intrusion on privacy can cause harm to social position and opportu-
nities, to personal and family status, for example, identification of an
anonymous sperm donor, and to self-image and perception by others.
A breach of confidentiality is unlawful, in most jurisdictions, and
may also be construed as a personal harm but the issue is
rather complex. In Sweden, there is a law requiring consent from a
proband in order to contact a genetic relative, for example, to inform
about a risk of breast cancer (Law on Genetic Integrity 2006:351).
Also, even the referring physician will not get data of genetic testing
necessary for further treatment strategies (for instance like cancer or
cardiomyopathies) if the patient does not allow it explicitly. Ordina-
rily, this does not constitute any problem since genetic relatives
care for each other or the patient has an interest that his treating
physician gets this information and thus allows such contacts.
However, there may be exceptions to these moral bonds within a
family and if the proband does not allow it, the doctor is bound by law
not to tell. In this case breaking the confidentiality agreement may,
arguably, lead to decreased risk of harm to others. In the United
Kingdom, disclosures are also permissible if the person consents to
them but a breach of confidentiality may also be lawful without
consent where there is a sufficiently strong public interest at stake
thus potentially avoiding a replication of the well-known USA case of
Tarasoff in which a psychiatrist failed to breach confidentiality
and warn a woman who was killed by one of his patients who had
specifically threatened her.21 From a consequentialist perspective,
whether a breach of confidentiality is good or bad is then an open
question.
Broken promises and mistrust may also lead to harm. For instance,
if a researcher informs an individual study participant that no one will
get access to the personal data except the researchers, and the
individual later learns that it is not possible to give such a guarantee
this may lead to decreased trust and this may in turn lead to harmful
consequences, for example, that study participants start opting out
of scientific studies. For these reasons, the proposal by Lunshof et al
that one should not promise more than one can keep and that the
rapid development in genetics and bioinformatics calls for an open
consent, for example, being open to study participants that there is no
guarantee of non-identification, was appropriate and timely.4 They
conclude, rightly in our view, that veracity and transparency should be
the leading principles in modern research on genotype–phenotype
interaction. Thus, research participants must be informed and under-
stand that although all measures will be taken to secure the data and
protect the privacy of the individual, there is no 100% guarantee, and
there is a small risk that the identity of one individual may be revealed
by outsider hackers.
It is common knowledge (personal communication) that patients
with rare diseases do acknowledge this risk and are keen to make
personal decisions based on their understanding of risks and benefits.
Many patients with rare and ultra-rare disease, where a firm clinical or
genetic diagnosis is elusive, predictions on inheritance, prognosis and
life expectancy cannot be made and treatments are unavailable,
consider identification as a minor risk and display their personal
information freely on the internet and social media. If children are
affected by the rare disease, these decisions will be made by their
parents or guardians. In contrast, patients who are pre-symptomatic
carriers of a genetic fault that predisposes them to develop a rare
condition, but do not show overt signs of the condition and do not
have any impact on their life quality, may feel that the risk of
identification out-weighs the benefits for research. An important issue
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in order to maintain trust and be honest to patients, in our view, is
how to consent participants. Consent is a two part process. Part one is
providing the participants with all the information about the study
and making sure they understate that. For example, participants need
clear information about the type, the purpose of the research. The
participants must understand that participating in a research does not
mean getting treatment. They also need to know why the research is
important in finding treatment for them and to other people suffering
from the same, related or different diseases. Other examples of
information that they need to know.
 How the data will be stored and who the data may be shared with,
and what the safeguards for abuse are. This includes information
about how likely it is that the Identifier can be hacked.
 What the advantages are of taking part. Be aware that there may
not be direct benefits for the participant, but they can help others
with the same disease. This is important for the management of
expectations.
 What the alternatives are to taking part?
 What costs arise for the participant?
 If data/biosamples can be exploited commercially, and that
 Participation is voluntary.
The second part of the consent is the signature itself, where they
sign to agree to participate in the study.
THE NEED TO BALANCE BENEFITS AND HARMS
Hypothetically, it is possible that on first sight, study participants may
prefer strong protections of their right to privacy and to autonomy in
the sense of making decisions in matters that directly concern them,
for example, excluding secondary uses of data and samples without
a re-consent, placing strict limits on sharing data and samples or
prohibiting unique identifiers. However, on closer inspection, if they
are informed about the benefits of sharing and being able to use
multiple data and sample collections with the possibility to distinguish
individuals, and the costs of re-consenting (or the cost of re-running the
research and recollecting the samples and data), they may reconsider.22
Responsible ethical deliberation need to take into consideration a more
comprehensive and broader evaluation balancing the options, both the
benefits and costs of acting as well as the benefits and costs of not
acting, or of acting in another way. Such broad and comprehensive
approaches are not always reflected in the ethics and policy literature on
re-identification. As argued by von Wright, to get access of something X
that one desires increases one’s welfare on the condition that one is
informed about the causal relations and consequences both of the
totality where X is part as well of the totality where not-X instead of X is
part.23 Informed preferences are more valuable than non-informed,
something we will get back to when we later refer to the empirical
literature on privacy.
Wrongings in the sense of not being able to keep promises may
be prevented by veracity and transparency as leading principles in
information and consent procedures. The risk of some harms may be
minimized by legislative measures. An essential part of the public trust
in medical research using genetic and other kinds of sensitive medical
information may depend on patients and research subjects knowing
that third parties are prohibited by law from requesting, or inquiring
about, genetic or medical information from an individual, with
the exception of specified medical situations. This is the case in
Sweden. According to Swedish legislation, there has been a shift of
attention from putting cumbersome restrictions on research to
prevent unauthorized use to making such use in itself unlawful. The
law on genetic integrity that came into effect 1 July 2006 laid down
that nobody may stipulate as a condition for entering into an
agreement, that another party should undergo a genetic examination
or submit genetic information about themselves. There should also be
a general prohibition to the effect that without support in law, genetic
information may not be sought after or used by anyone other than the
person that the information is about. This applies even if the person
concerned has given his or her consent to such an investigation or use,
but not if they themselves have requested it.
The proposed prohibition is not to be applicable to genetic
information that is sought for medical purposes, for scientific or
genealogical research or to obtain evidence in legal proceedings. For
criminal investigations and for insurance purposes, there is regulation
in place. Illegitimate requests of or uses of information may still be
a problem, but this risk is minimized since such actions will, according
to this law, constitute criminal offences. A scale of penalties that
includes fines or a term of imprisonment up to 6 months will enforce
the proposed prohibitions.24 Legislation like this and similar legally
binding agreements in sharing and access documents may minimize the
risk of harm related to unauthorized use. The remaining risks of harm
should be balanced against the expected benefits.
HOW CONCERNED ARE PATIENTS AND THE GENERAL
PUBLIC?
The literature with concerned scientists, ethicists, lawyers and policy
makers is growing almost exponentially in the field of re-identification
and privacy. The question is whether these concerns are a true
reflection of the potential research participants’? There are a growing
number of studies investigating how individuals of different ages look
upon and manage risks related to the use of the internet and social
media.25–27 Privacy concerns have also been the focus of many, mostly
qualitative studies related to health care and hospital settings.28–30
Several studies across different medical fields show that patients
understand very well that doctors need to share patient information
with other doctors involved in their treatment, but this does not
include administrative staff.31,32 The increased use of electronic medical
records has inspired a growing number of proposals for technical
solutions in order to make information accessible while protecting
privacy interests.33 Issues related to access to medical records for
research, for example, in primary health care have been focus for some
smaller studies, indicating that patients are not aware about the need
for this research but, when told, were concerned about the leakage
of information to unauthorized persons.34 Regarding what kind of
information and consent procedure that is appropriate for research
using medical records the results are not conclusive. Some want to give
explicit consent while others are satisfied with information and the
possibility to opt-out.35–37 Clinical anecdotal evidence indicates that
patients with rare diseases are often aware of the fact that there are only
limited resources available to carry out research for their particular
condition. Therefore, they often altruistically donate their personal
time, data and samples to research, and expect that the utility of these
gifts is maximized for public good. They are often surprised to hear that
data from one research organization cannot be shared with another
limiting the conclusions drawn from the research or requiring data
and/or samples to be collected again.
Regarding the use of registries and databases with medical and
personal information there are only a few studies. A large and well-
designed study of values related to this was done in Great Britain in
2005.38 The background of the study was the perceived increase in
regulatory requirements and demands of specific informed consent
from ethical review boards and data inspection authorities in relation
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to the use of personal data for research, a request made in the name of
protection if privacy.39–41 In all, 2872 individuals in a representative
sample of the British population, 97% of those participating in the
investigations made by the national statistics bureau in March and
April that year, responded to the survey (response rates 62% (March)
and 69% (April), respectively). A majority of the British general public
did not regard the use of coded data from the national cancer registry
for research as an intrusion of privacy. Seventy-two percent did
not think that provision of name, address and postal number or
receiving a letter with a request for participation in a research project
constituted a breach of their privacy. The study draws the conclusion
that the increased regulatory requirements are not in accord with what
the general public thinks on these matters.
In a study about attitudes to research among participants in
a rehabilitation registry in United States, researchers wanted to see
whether there were differences in attitudes depending on ethnicity.42
There was a difference but not that much. In all, 72% of the
Afro-Americans and 62% of the white population were positive to
participate in registry-based research. As indicated there is need of
more studies in order to see whether the protection of privacy
suggested in the literature harmonizes with the attitudes of patients
and the general public. A deficiency with the current studies that then
needs to be acknowledged is that questions are seldom formulated
in a way so that one can see how an individual balances different
preferences against each other, for example, protection of privacy
against the prospect of successful research needed to provide new
knowledge and treatment. The need to incorporate different views
means that a robust and reproducible method of eliciting preferences
for risk of harm is needed: benefit trade-offs must be used to ensure
that the resulting values are sufficiently robust to use the information
to guide the future development of regulatory policies in this area.
CONCLUSION
Re-identification may potentially bring harmful consequences for
the individual, for example, related to insurance and discrimination.
On the other hand, as has been demonstrated, there are clear benefits
in terms of patient safety with regard to diagnosis and treatment as
well as possibilities to generate new and improved treatment through
research provided that one can distinguish between individuals
by identification. We suggest that open and transparent information
and consent processes, not promising too much and the use of safe
unique personal identifiers, for example, the GUID or HD identifiers,
represent a morally favourable balance, leading to the following
recommendations for governance of biobank and data research.
There is no doubt that there are potential risks associated with the
handling of personal data for medical purposes. The research
community must therefore show itself equal to the task of managing
those risks and deserving the trust of those whose data it utilizes. The
need for a global alliance of responsible data sharing is now well
recognized (World Wide Web Consortium), but there must be an
ongoing commitment to high professional standards and to the
training of the next generation of researchers in the ethics of research.
Adequately informed consent of research participants is one
mechanism which contributes to responsible data sharing, but ethical
access to, sharing, and use of data are compatible with broad consent,
and even no consent, where the justification is ethical, the use lawful
and the processing of data is conducted under demonstrably high
standards of governance. We have argued for the necessity of using
a unique identifier where data from multiple sources are to be
accessed, shared and exchanged. In most cases, the use of personal
data in research produces benefits which far outweigh the risks though
it is important to have an ongoing dialogue with patients and the
wider public to ensure that researchers are aware of their concerns and
that the public gain an informed understanding of the risks and
benefits of research.43 Researchers should show willing to facilitate
upstream engagement with research participants and include govern-
ance structures, which reflect the patient/public perspective (could
refer to TREAT-NMD or other project examples). As data collection
and sharing becomes ever more complex and international there will
be a need for harmonized ethical, legal and regulatory approaches and
these must recognize the necessary role of a unique identifier to
responsible data sharing.
TERMINOLOGY
Identified data
Data labelled or linked to the individual in a way that makes them
directly identifiable (name and surname or social security numbers).44
Coded data (may be single or double coded)
Personally identifying information is removed and replaced with
a code. In the case of double-coding, two or more codes are assigned
to the same donor’s data held in different data sets, with the key
connecting the codes back to the donor’s direct identifiers held by
a third party and not available to the researchers.
Anonymized data
Data that have been identified earlier or coded, but the identification,
or the code and the code key have been destroyed, and thus there is no
longer any link to the individual.
Anonymous data
There are no links to the individual donor, the data and biospecimens
were never associated with identifiers, and the risk of identification
of individuals is very low. There may be general descriptions such as
‘man, aged 50–55 years, cholesterol level 240 mg per 100 ml'.
Re-identified data
Data that were rendered anonymous but the identity has been retrieved
by matching the anonymous information of different databases.
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